Austin’s pluralism allows for a certain kind of common sense that isn’t common but learned. It strikes me as reminiscent of Hume’s thought that common sense is rooted in experience. That is, if you have the applicable knowledge, Austin’s points regarding ordinary language seem almost obvious. His pluralism allows for things to just be the things they are: dreams are dreams, illusions are illusions, and so on. Despite liking this take on material things, I’m still apprehensive to completely do away with the notion of sense data. I think Austin does a good job of highlighting ordinary language and providing an account of what the “normal person” is thinking or saying, but the simplicity of Ayer’s sense data could be beneficial in certain aspects and areas -- perhaps very few certain aspects but aspects nonetheless.

First, I’d like to look at Ayer’s bent stick example. Ayer claims that a stick, which is straight, becomes qualitatively indistinguishable when it is placed in water and suddenly appears bent. His claim is founded on the sense data we perceive both when the stick is out of and in the water, and that we can’t tell the difference between the stick being straight and the stick appearing bent while still remaining straight. Austin describes it: “Ayer says (a) that since the stick looks bent but is straight, ‘at least one of the visual appearances of the stick is delusive’; and (b) that ‘what we see [directly anyway] is not the real quality of [a few lines later, not part of] a material thing.’” (29)  In reality, it’s 100% distinguishable and can be attributed to science, and neither appearance of the stick is delusive. Whether or not you know it, it’s the way that the light is hitting the water and bending, refracting, before it reaches your eye and making it seem like the stick has been bent. This is just a matter of fact. It’s the way things go. It just is. There still is a stick, it is still straight, yet it still appears bent thanks to rays of light. Austin and I agree that these instances are distinguishable and that there are no delusions involved; however, I’d take it a step farther and insist Ayer is being ignorant and rude in assuming otherwise. It doesn’t require a lot of thinking or learning or experimentation to discover what is really happening when you put a stick in water. Even if you don’t understand the science behind why it is happening, a “normal person” would still pull the stick out, examine it, stick it back in the water, and, in the end, shrug their shoulders in acceptance that whatever is happening just happens. There would be no desire or need for sense data to be brought in to describe what was happening, nor would there be a question of if my senses are deceiving me.

Next, let’s look at Austin’s example of Sirius. The example goes as follows: “Suppose that I look through a telescope and you ask me ‘what do you see?’ I may answer (1) ‘A bright speck’; (2) ‘a star’; (3) ‘Sirius’; (4) ‘The image in the fourteenth mirror of the telescope.’ [a few lines later] The image in the fourteenth mirror of the telescope is a bright speck, this bright speck is a star, and this star is Sirius” (99) For me, this causes no issue. I can understand the use of the word ‘image’ might be a little odd -- What is an image? Is the image different from seeing with the naked eye? -- however, I take no issue with it. It might have been a better choice of words to say ‘What I see in the fourteenth mirror of the telescope…’ but, for ordinary language and the normal person, ‘image’ is a sufficient alternative. As Austin points out further down, it’s a matter of circumstances and “what sort of answer I expect you to be interested in” as to which term, or phrase, I use to describe what I see in the telescope. This follows with my previous statement that Austin’s pluralism allows for a kind of “learned” common sense. That is, if you have the applicable knowledge and know what words mean in an ordinary sense, then you have everything you need to discuss and describe things. You don’t need sense data. In fact, this example reminds me of Frege’s sense and references. Each option is alluding to the same answer of what is being seen, what’s being referenced, but they have different senses or ways to get to understanding the answer. Much like ‘the morning star’, ‘the evening star’, and ‘Venus’; these things are the same and the circumstances would determine which one I use to describe the thing.

Sure, material things can be discussed using sense data; sense data can be seen as the atoms of language and sentences. It’s the absolute smallest form of how something can be described, but, at the end of the day, everything can be boiled down to a smaller form. Austin’s example of saccharine can be boiled down to different chemical compounds mixed together to create a different taste. Material things can be boiled down to atoms. The refraction of the light rays can be boiled down to photons. This doesn’t mean that ordinary language isn’t used in these instances. “Normal people” don’t use photons or atoms to discuss the things they see or what is happening around them. We don’t say, “there are photons penetrating the series of neurons and synapses,” so why would we use sense data to talk about things? (That is [loosely], ‘there is light in my retinas’.) There is one instance that I think sense data might be used. In the instance of someone experiencing hallucinations, or better, someone who is blind. For someone hallucinating, they might employ something like sense data to describe what it is they are seeing; however, only if they are seeing something that has never before been seen or conceived. If they are seeing pink rats, they will say so and that is completely acceptable to do. Then someone not experiencing pink rats will say something like, “there aren't any pink rats here… or existing at all; I think you’re hallucinating.” If they are seeing something that has never been seen or conceived before, they will have to describe it in a way that the other person can understand and illustrate for themselves. For example, unreal objects. They don’t exist so you could employ sense data to describe what is being seen. This is true for someone who was born blind. Someone who has never seen anything will never be able to have a mental picture of what a ‘rat’ is or ‘pink.’ This allows for sense data to be used to describe things to the blind person, but would it even provide said person with the adequate knowledge to ‘see’ the same thing in reality? You could use sense data to describe things until you were blue in the face, but would it make a practical difference anyway?

In conclusion, Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia has done a good job of swaying me to the side of ordinary language, but Ayer’s sense data can’t totally be thrown away just yet. The ease of boiling everything down to sense data seems ridiculous when you realize you can just shrug your shoulders and call yourself a realist. That’s just the way things are; dreams are dreams; deceptions are defects in our mental capacities -- yay for pluralism -- however, sense data accepted as the atomic level of language and depictions might be relevant to keep around, not for everyone, but for some people or professions.